

PHI 500: Plato's Republic
Spring 2025

The City of Pigs as The Incomplete True City

In Book 2 of the *Republic*, Socrates and his interlocutors begin constructing an ideal city to discover justice in the city so that they may understand justice in the soul (368c7). This construction unfolds in three stages. The first stage is the city of bare necessities, referred to as the "city of pigs" (372d4). The second introduces luxuries, creating the "feverish city" (372e8). The third adds a guardian class and an education system, ultimately resulting in the "beautiful city," or Kallipolis. The Kallipolis is meant to be the ideal, true city in the *Republic*. However, in the transition from the first to the second phase, Socrates calls the city of pigs the "true" city (372e5). This comment raises two puzzles: Why does Socrates call the city of pigs the "true" city? And if the true city has already been identified in Book Two, why does he continue to develop the ideal city over the subsequent books?

In this paper, I argue that Socrates calls the city of pigs the "true" city because it is *the incomplete true city*. In the subsequent books, he continues building toward the complete true city, i.e. the Kallipolis. In Part I, I describe the city of pigs. In Part II, I defend the claim that Socrates views the city of pigs as incomplete (**Claim 1**). I suggest three key respects in which it is lacking: (i) it does not possess the four cardinal virtues; (ii) it lacks the safeguards (namely, the guardian class and education system) needed to prevent it from falling into decadence; and (iii) it does not contain the life of the mind necessary to achieve true fulfillment. In Part III, I present two reasons why, despite these shortcomings, the City of Pigs can still be considered a "true" city. First, it contains nothing incompatible with Kallipolis, i.e., it requires only additions, no subtractions (**Claim 2**). Second, it already contains a necessary condition for justice in Kallipolis: the principle of specialization (**Claim 3**). Finally, I offer two lines of support for my conclusion that the City of Pigs is *the* incomplete true city. (**Claim 4**).

Part I: What is the City of Pigs

The construction of the city is based on two principles. First, humans have many needs, but no one is individually self-sufficient (369b5-9). I will refer to this as the *principle of individual insufficiency*. Second, better and more plentiful goods can be produced if each person does the one thing they are naturally suited for (370c3-5). I will refer to this as the *principle of specialization*. The construction of the City of Pigs is carried out by systematically identifying a distinct need that has not yet been met in the city, and then adding what is required to meet it. The list below indicates the needs and corresponding additions to the city in the sequence in which they are identified.

- Food: farmer (369d1)
- Shelter: builder (369d4)
- Clothes and related goods: weaver, shoemaker (369d4-7)
- Bodily needs: caretakers of bodily needs (369d9)

So far, the city is minimal, with only 4-5 men. At this point, Socrates introduces the principle of specialization and then continues the process. (370c3-5)

- Tools for basic work: craftsmen, i.e., carpenters and metalworkers (370c7-d6)
- Animals for plowing, hauling, hides, and fleeces: herdsmen, i.e., cowherds and shepherds (370d9-e2)
- Mechanism for sharing things externally, i.e.,
 - Exports and imports: Trade (370e5)
 - Imports from other cities: merchants (370e9, 371a10-13)
 - More production for trade: more farmers and craftsmen (370e12-371a7)
 - Sea trade expertise: sea experts (371a16-b1)
- Mechanism for sharing goods internally: marketplace, currency, retailers (371b5)
- Place for those with weak minds but strong bodies: wage-earners (371e)

At this point, they wonder whether the city is complete (371e9), and if so, where justice and injustice would be found within it (371e12-13). Adeimantus has no answer, so Socrates suggests they try describing the life its citizens would lead: they will produce food, wine, clothes, and shoes; build houses; work naked in summer and adequately clothed in winter; feast on “noble cakes and loaves” served on “reeds or clean leaves”; recline on “couches strewn with yew and myrtle”; drink wine in moderation; hymn the gods; enjoy sex; and produce only as many children as their resources allow to avoid poverty and war (372c4-d2). Glaucon interrupts to complain that the city lacks relishes (372c3).¹ In response, Socrates allows the addition of minimal relishes (salt, olives, and cheese) and simple desserts (figs, chickpeas, and beans). He comments that the people will drink moderately, live in peace and health, and pass this way of life to their children (372c8-d2).

This is the final description of the city from the first phase before Glaucon rejects it as “a city of pigs.” (379d4) Glaucon demands that “proper couches” and “the relishes and desserts people have nowadays” (372d8-e1) be added to the city. Socrates concedes, marking the transition to the second phase. He acknowledges that they are now considering not merely the origins of a city, but “a city that is luxurious” (372e2). Yet he still calls the first city “the true city” and “the healthy one” (372e5-6). Socrates explains that they will examine this city of luxuries because it may reveal how justice and injustice arise in cities (372e4-5). Thus begins phase two. They now add a multitude of things to the city that exceeds what is necessary (373b3), the feverish city in contrast to the healthy city of phase one (372e2-373a7). Overindulgence in the feverish city leads to war, requiring the creation of a guardian class (373d7-374a). They then describe the guardians’ qualities and the education system needed to produce them. With the introduction of the guardian class and the education system, they enter phase three, culminating in the Kallipolis, i.e., the beautiful city.

The final city, Kallipolis, looks very different from the City of Pigs. Why, then, does Socrates still call the City of Pigs the true city? And if he thinks it is the true city, why does he continue the construction? My answer is that the City of Pigs is *the incomplete true city*. In the

¹ ‘relishes’ are defined as “anything eaten with such staples as barley and wheat bread” in the CDC Reeve translation. (p. 328)

next section, I argue that Socrates considers it incomplete and identify key features it lacks. I then explain why, despite its incompleteness, it can still plausibly be called the true city.

Part II: The City of Pigs as Incomplete

I first defend the claim that Socrates views the city of pigs as incomplete. I then suggest three key ways in which Socrates is likely to find it lacking.

Claim 1: Socrates sees the City of Pigs as incomplete.

Proposition 1.1: If the city were complete, they would be able to find justice and injustice within it. The first support for this proposition comes from Book 2, just after the city/soul analogy is presented and before they begin constructing the city. Socrates motivates their construction of a city as follows: if they could look at a city coming to be, they would witness justice and injustice coming to be as well. Importantly, “once the process is completed,” they could expect to find justice and injustice “more easily” (369a5-10). The second support for this proposition comes from Socrates’ exchange with Adeimantus in Book 2, just after they add wage workers to the city of pigs. (371e9-13) Socrates asks Adeimantus whether the city has reached completion. When Adeimantus suggests that perhaps it has (371e9) Socrates immediately follows up with the question: “Then where are justice and injustice to be found in it?” (371e12-13). This suggests Socrates’ expectation that *if the city were complete, they would be able to find justice and injustice within it*. Finally, the third support for this proposition comes from Book 4, where Socrates says that if they have reached a completely good city they should expect to find justice, wisdom, courage and temperance within it. (427c4-e13)

Proposition 1.2: They are unable to find justice and injustice in the city of pigs. In the transition from the first to the second phase of construction, Socrates explicitly says that they should consider the feverish city because “by examining such a city we might perhaps see how justice and injustice grow up in cities” (372e4-5). That is, the city of pigs has not yet allowed them to see justice and injustice, and thus moving to a city that does “may not be a bad idea” (372e2). I take this to imply that *they are unable to find justice and injustice in the city of pigs*.

Thus, Socrates’ reasoning can be stated as follows:

PI.1: *If the city were complete, they would be able to find justice and injustice within it.*

P2.2: *They are unable to find justice and injustice in the city of pigs.*

CI: *Therefore, the city of pigs is incomplete.*

Glaucon’s opinion that the City of Pigs is incomplete is more clearly visible than Socrates’. He explicitly rejects the first city by calling it a “city of pigs” (379d4), signaling that it is missing something. This remark directly answers Socrates’ earlier question about whether the city has reached completion (371e9), implying that, for Glaucon, it has not. However, while Glaucon thinks what is missing are “proper couches” and “the relishes and desserts that people have nowadays” (372d8-e1), Socrates is unlikely to agree, since he discourages indulgence in unnecessary appetites throughout the *Republic*.² Instead, I suggest that Socrates considers the

² See, for example, Socrates’ description of the democratic man in Book 8 (560d8-561e6) or Book 9 (590a9). and critique of unnecessary desires in the feverish city (373b3-4) and his later classification of such desires as harmful and indulgent

city of pigs incomplete for different reasons. I now identify three key ways in which he is likely to have regarded the city as lacking.

Firstly, the City of Pigs lacks the four cardinal virtues as defined at the end of Book 4. According to Book 4, a complete city must exhibit the four cardinal virtues: temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice (427c4-e13). I show below that none of these, as defined in Book 4, apply to the city of pigs. Temperance is defined as the agreement in belief between the rulers and the subjects about who should rule (433c5). The city of pigs cannot have an agreement in belief between the rulers and the subjects since there are no rulers and subjects within it. Thus, the city of pigs is not temperate by this definition. Courage is defined as “the preservation among the soldiers of the law-inculcated belief about what should inspire terror and what should not” (433c7-8). The City of Pigs has no soldiers to whom this definition would apply, nor does it have philosopher-rulers to create the laws that would inculcate such beliefs. Thus, the City of Pigs cannot be called courageous by this definition. Wisdom in the city is defined as follows: for a city to be wise is for some part of it to possess knowledge of what is good for the whole (428e7-12). Philosophers are the only ones who can possess knowledge (475b7-477a4). Since the City of Pigs lacks an education system, it has no philosophers. Therefore, no part of the city possesses knowledge. Thus, the city of pigs cannot be called wise. Justice is defined as the property that each of the three classes in the city do their own work without meddling with the other classes (434c7-10). The City of Pigs is not divided into multiple classes. Thus, the city of pigs cannot be called just by this definition. Since the City of Pigs lacks all four virtues as defined in Book 4, it cannot be called a completely good city (433c5).

Secondly, the City of Pigs lacks the guardian class and education system necessary to prevent degeneration. Socrates warns us throughout the *Republic* that both cities and souls are highly susceptible to corruption unless properly governed and educated. In Book 8, the ideal city gets corrupted when the guardian class gets defective individuals under whose supervision the education system no longer works in the way it is supposed to (546d-547a). The subsequent faulty constitutions (timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny) each continue to get corrupted because they appoint the wrong guardians. None of the faulty constitutions manage to restore the correct education system and the correct guardian class. The souls of the individuals within the city are also immensely susceptible to corruption, as exemplified in the feverish city. Socrates stresses that even souls with the best natures can become exceptionally corrupt when raised without the right education (491d7-e6).

To prevent these kinds of corruption, Socrates introduces the guardian class and the education system to the ideal city. The guardian class is responsible for keeping the city “one” by preventing faction (422e7-423c1-3) and for maintaining laws, including the principle of specialization (423c6-d6). Most importantly, they guard the education system (423d8). The education system prevents the individuals in the city from slipping into overindulgence. Instead, it produces “moderate men” with “good natures” (423d8-424b1). The education system also ensures that the right individuals continue to be selected as future guardians. Thus, these two institutions are interdependent. Without the guardian class doing their job properly, the education system begins to decline. Without the education system, no proper guardians can be produced. If either fails, the city degenerates.

The City of Pigs lacks both a guardian class and an education system. Firstly, without the education system to provide the right upbringing to the individuals in the city, there would be no way to produce the kind of individuals in the city of pigs who “drink in moderation” (372c8). Secondly, in the absence of these institutions, there is nothing to prevent the city from sliding into decadence or abandoning the principle of specialization that originally structured it. Even a city limited to necessary appetites, like the city of pigs, will fail to preserve itself without these guardrails. It will inevitably fall into the decadence of the feverish city if the individuals in the city are not educated from childhood on how to restrain their unnecessary appetites (559b8-11).

Thirdly, the City of Pigs lacks the life of the mind that leads to knowledge of the Forms and true happiness. Even if the City of Pigs could avoid decadence and faction, it would still be incomplete. For Socrates, a good life is not merely one of healthy, moderate fulfillment of appetites. Rather, true fulfillment is achieved only through the life of the mind. In Book 6, Socrates states that knowledge of the Form of the Good is greater than all other virtues, since “it is by their relation to it that just things and the others become useful and beneficial.” Without knowing the Form of the Good, “even the fullest possible knowledge of other things is of no benefit to us” (504d4-505b3). In Book 7, Socrates explains that only after the soul takes an “upward journey into the intelligible realm” can one see the Form of the Good. Enabling this upward journey into the intelligible realm is the purpose of the philosopher’s education (521c).

In Book 7, when discussing the Allegory of the Cave, Socrates suggests that those who escape from the cave, i.e., philosophers, will ultimately consider themselves happy and all those trapped in the cave as pitiable (516c3-5). Later in Book 9, Socrates argues that the philosopher, as the one with knowledge of the Form of the Good, is the happiest (580b7), experiences the best pleasure one can experience, i.e., the pleasure associated with the rational element of the soul (580d-583a), and experiences true fulfillment (583a11-586e11). The City of Pigs contains no features that encourage philosophy or the life of the mind in general. The city is not just missing the four cardinal virtues, as argued above, but it is missing the greatest thing, i.e., knowledge of the Form of the Good. Thus, no individual within it, even those naturally suited to philosophy, would experience the most happiness, the best pleasure, or the truest fulfillment.

In sum, Socrates calls the City of Pigs the “true” city, but he does not stop there because it is incomplete. It lacks the four cardinal virtues, the guardian class and education system needed to prevent degeneration, and the philosophical life that makes true fulfillment possible. Without these, the city cannot sustain its moderation or allow its citizens to live the best kind of life. Thus, the City of Pigs in its incomplete form would fail both to preserve its constitution and to enable its citizens to fulfill their highest capacities.

Part III: Why is the City of Pigs the “True” City?

Despite its incompleteness, Socrates calls the city of pigs the “true” city. I present two reasons why the City of Pigs could be considered an incomplete true city. First, the city of pigs contains *nothing incompatible with the Kallipolis*. It requires only additions, no subtractions. Second, the city of pigs already *contains a necessary condition for justice in the Kallipolis*, i.e., the principle of specialization. Finally, I present two arguments to support the claim that the City of Pigs is the true city, albeit incomplete.

Claim 2: The City of Pigs contains nothing incompatible with the Kallipolis, i.e., nothing in it needs to be removed to arrive at the ideal city.

To support this claim, I return to the four cardinal virtues and show that none are contradicted in the city of pigs. First, consider courage. The City of Pigs lacks a guardian class, and we are given no indication of what its citizens fear or do not fear. There is, therefore, no basis to claim that they hold false beliefs about what should inspire terror. Second, consider temperance. The City of Pigs has no ruling class, nor are we told anything about the citizens' beliefs regarding who should rule. Thus, there is no evidence of disagreement about who should rule. In both these cases, courage and temperance, what we see is not contradiction, but absence: the absence of the relevant beliefs. This absence supports my earlier claim that the city is incomplete rather than defective.³ Third, consider justice. The citizens of the City of Pigs do not meddle with one another's work, as ensured by the principle of specialization. Finally, consider wisdom. The city of pigs contains nothing that reason would prohibit, as I will argue by focusing on two characteristics of the city.

Claim 2.1 The City of Pigs contains only necessary appetites, i.e., appetites that reason would not prohibit.

*Necessary appetites*⁴ are defined as those that either (a) cannot be denied without leading to death or (b) are beneficial to us. We are by nature compelled to satisfy these. By contrast, *unnecessary appetites* are those that bring no benefit and may cause harm, and which can be restrained through proper education from childhood (558d11-c1).

Claim 2.1.A: The City of Pigs is limited to the fulfillment of "necessary appetites." With the first unnecessary desire being fulfilled, the city becomes the feverish city. Socrates notes that the city of pigs provides only necessities (373a3-5). The feverish city is created by adding "a multitude of things that go beyond what is necessary" (373b3-4). At this point, however, Socrates has not yet defined necessary and unnecessary appetites explicitly. These definitions appear later in Book 8. When they do, they follow the same pattern as the earlier shift from the city of pigs to the feverish city.

Socrates offers examples of necessary appetites in Book 8, "to have a pattern to follow" (559a7). The first is the desire to eat for health and well-being, including desires for bread and relishes (559a9). Bread satisfies both criteria of necessity, i.e., it is both essential and beneficial (559b3).⁵ Relishes, by contrast, are necessary only insofar as they remain beneficial and conducive to well-being (559b6-7). Thus, a desire is only necessary as long as it remains beneficial; when it ceases to do so, it becomes unnecessary. Socrates defines unnecessary appetites as those that go beyond these basic desires, seeking other sorts of foods that are

³ I treat these absences as signs of incompleteness, not defects, because Socrates' method of constructing the city is additive. At no point does Socrates suggest that something in the City of Pigs must be removed or corrected. Rather, he continues to build upon it. This contrasts with the descriptions of the faulty constitutions in Book 8, which are presented as corruptions that require correction or replacement.

⁴ Note that Socrates uses the terms "appetites" and "desires" interchangeably in the passages where the definitions of necessary and unnecessary appetites occurs, i.e. 558d11-c1.

⁵ According to the CDC Reeve translation, "Bread is used here to mean 'the staff of life.' That is why one dies for want of it." (p256)

harmful to the body or the soul's capacity for wisdom and temperance (559b8-9). These can be restrained through proper education (559b8-c1).

This same pattern is evident in the earlier discussion with Glaucon in Book 2. Initially, Socrates permits the addition of simple relishes and desserts to the city of pigs, explaining that these additions will allow the citizens to "live in peace and good health" (372c8-d1). This indicates that these relishes, at this point, remain within the scope of necessary appetites, as they contribute to well-being. However, when Glaucon demands more elaborate relishes and desserts, Socrates concedes but notes that they are now considering a different kind of city, the feverish city (372e2-373a7). This shift occurs because Glaucon exhibits "an appetite that goes beyond these [necessary appetites] and seeks other sorts of foods" (559b8-c1). Just as in Book 8, where such an appetite marks the transition from necessary to unnecessary desires, in Book 2 it marks the move from the City of Pigs to the feverish city.

Claim 2.1.B: True reason would not prohibit necessary appetites. After defining necessary and unnecessary appetites in Book 8, Socrates notes that the failure of the democratic man to distinguish between these two kinds of appetites is what causes the decline from the oligarchic to the democratic soul. In this discussion, Socrates indicates that necessary appetites are those that "true reason" would allow for (561b7-c4). Book 9 also shows that even the philosopher, ruled by reason, must fulfill necessary appetites, further confirming that reason does not forbid these desires (581d10-e4). I use these two passages to support the claim that necessary appetites are permitted by true reason.

Claim 2.2: The City of Pigs does not contain any unjust actions, i.e., it does not contain actions that reason would prohibit.

Just actions are defined as those that engender justice in the soul of the person performing them (444c8). Socrates defines engendering justice as "establish[ing] the elements in the soul in a natural relation of mastering and being mastered by one another" (444d7). Conversely, *unjust actions* are those that engender injustice by "establish[ing] a relation of ruling and being ruled by one another that is contrary to nature" (444d7).

In Socrates' description of the life led by the people in the City of Pigs, almost the entire description focuses on their actions (372a3-d1). This lifestyle reflects externally observable moderation. For example, they "drink in moderation" and "produce no more children than their resources allow" (372b7-c1). All their actions involve the simple, restrained satisfaction of necessary appetites; there is no suggestion of luxury or overindulgence. None of these actions indicate the meddling of the appetitive or spirited element with reason. By Socrates' definition, unjust actions introduce disorder into the soul by arranging its parts "contrary to nature," establishing an improper relation of ruling and being ruled (444d7). Since the citizens of the City of Pigs are shown to satisfy only necessary appetites in moderation, their actions do not suggest such internal conflict, and thus do not engender injustice.

To be clear, I am not suggesting that the individuals within the City of Pigs are just. There is no confirmation that their souls are ruled by the rational element. Moreover, as Socrates makes clear in Books 6 and 7, without the philosopher's education, no individual would know the Form of the Good, and thus none would be truly just. My claim here is only that none of the *actions*

performed by these individuals could be described as engendering injustice, since they all involve the moderate fulfillment of necessary appetites.

Claim 3: The City of Pigs already contains an essential condition for justice in the Kallipolis, i.e. the principle of specialization.

While the City of Pigs lacks the four cardinal virtues (as shown in Part II), it does contain an essential condition for justice: the principle of specialization. In Book 4, Socrates and his interlocutors attempt to find justice in the city (427d8-434c10). Socrates phrases the definition of justice in various ways that can be summed up as follows: “The city is just because each of its parts does what it is supposed to.” The term “parts” can be interpreted in two ways.⁶ **Version 1:** “Parts” could refer to each person in the city. This would make the definition: “The city is just if each person within it does what they are supposed to” (433a4-5, 433d1-5, 434d7-9). **Version 2:** “Parts” could refer to each of the three classes in the city. This would make the definition: “The city is just if each class within it does what it is supposed to” (434c7-10). My purpose in presenting Version 1 is not to imply that it is the correct definition.⁷ Rather, I present both versions to (a) highlight that, prior to arriving at the final Version 2, Socrates appeals several times to Version 1, and (b) note that, under Version 1, the City of Pigs would qualify as just, since it is structured by the principle of specialization. Each person in the City of Pigs does what they are supposed to do.

While Socrates does not explicitly state which of these two definitions is correct within these passages, he does provide a more explicit comparison of parallel definitions of injustice. When searching for injustice in the city, Socrates states that if a craftsman attempts to do the work of another craftsman, such as a carpenter doing the shoemaker’s work, the city suffers little harm (434a3-6). However, if a craftsman tries to do the work of a soldier, or a soldier the work of a ruler, the harm to the city is much greater (434a8-b6). This meddling among the three classes is described as the greatest harm and is thus defined as injustice (434c7). In this way, Socrates explicitly defines injustice in terms of the three classes (434b8-c5), never suggesting that injustice might occur simply when one craftsman interferes with another craftsman’s work. He then arrives at Version 2 of the definition of justice by contrasting it with the definition of injustice (434c7-10).

I use this line of reasoning to suggest the following: the meddling of the first kind (craftsman versus craftsman) does not cause the greatest harm, but it does break the principle of doing one’s own work, a key property shared with the second, more serious kind of meddling. Without the first principle being observed, the second would not be possible. In this sense, a city with the first kind of meddling contains *a necessary condition for the worst kind of evil* though it

⁶ A third possible definition of justice appears in these passages, namely that X is just if it does what it is supposed to do and does not meddle with the work of others (433a7-b1). I do not consider this definition here, as it is incompatible with the definition of justice in the soul and is therefore likely incorrect. Exploring why Socrates presents this third formulation is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I assume that Socrates’ intended definition is that X is just if all of its parts do what they are supposed to do. The ambiguity I am probing at is, in the case of the city, what exactly is meant by ‘parts’.

⁷ Version 2 of the definition is the final one they arrive at, and the one that makes sense with the city soul analogy, so is most plausibly the correct one. That is why in Part II, I used that as the standard definition of justice in the city.

does not contain the worst kind itself, i.e., injustice. Analogously, the lack of meddling in Version 1 also reflects the principle of specialization, which is essential for the more complete justice defined in Version 2. While Version 1 is not equivalent to Version 2, it nonetheless contains a necessary precondition for it: unless each person does their own work, the more complex structure of class-based justice could not arise. In this sense, the City of Pigs, by embodying the principle of specialization at the individual level, possesses an essential but incomplete feature of justice. This reading is supported by Socrates' description of the principle of specialization as an "image of justice" at the end of Book 4 (443c3-6). Thus, although the City of Pigs does not yet have the full division of classes necessary for Version 2 justice, it still contains a necessary condition for it.

Claim 4: The City of Pigs is *the* incomplete true city.

Thus far, I have argued that (a) the city of pigs is incomplete, (b) it contains nothing incompatible with Kallipolis, and (c) it already includes a necessary condition for justice in Kallipolis: the principle of specialization. I now bring these claims together to support my central thesis that the City of Pigs is *the* incomplete true city. I offer two additional lines of support for this thesis.

First, Socrates repeatedly insists that there is only one true, virtuous constitution, while there are many faulty ones (422e7-423c1-3, 445c4-d1, 543c6-544d2). There is no indication that Socrates counts the city of pigs among the defective constitutions. The City of Pigs lacks the defects that Socrates attributes to the four constitutions in Book 8: it has no factions, no rule by the wrong class, and does not honor the wrong things. What it lacks are the institutions needed to prevent such defects, but as argued earlier, these are absences, not present vices. As soon as a defect appears, such as the indulgence of unnecessary appetites, the city becomes the feverish city - a fundamentally different and defective city. However, as it is described at the end of phase one, the city of pigs contains no such defect. Given Socrates' claim that there is only one virtuous city and many faulty ones, and given that the city of pigs does not share the traits of the faulty constitutions, it follows that the city of pigs must be the one virtuous city, albeit in an incomplete form.

Second, Socrates' language elsewhere in the *Republic* supports the plausibility of this reading. At the end of Book 4, he claims they have found the just city and the just man, even though, as Glaucon later observes and Socrates accepts, they still have "a finer city and man" to describe (543c6). This is because the philosopher's education is not introduced until Book 7, without which neither the city nor its rulers could truly be just. Nevertheless, Socrates is willing to call the city at the end of Book 4 the just city, acknowledging its incompleteness while treating it as the true city in an early stage of construction. In the same way, the City of Pigs can be understood as the true city at an even earlier stage. Like the city at the end of Book 4, it possesses essential features, most notably the principle of specialization, but lacks others, such as the guardian class and the philosopher's education. Just as the early education system in Book 4 prepares the ground for the philosopher's education in Book 7, the principle of specialization in the City of Pigs lays the foundation for the justice of Kallipolis. This continuity extends even to the city's final form in Book 10, where, after banning most forms of art, Socrates allows only hymns to the gods and praises of good men (607a2-4). In the City of Pigs, too, the citizens are described as hymning the gods (372b6), a practice that remains unchanged throughout the city's

development. Thus, the City of Pigs is best understood as the true city under construction, in other words, *the incomplete true city*.

References

Plato, C.D.C Reeve. Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 2004.

“This paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.”

Nimra Nadeem